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Abstract: We study the informational content of dividends on three Nordic civil law markets, where other 
simultaneous but blurring motives for dividends may be weaker. Using aggregate data on real earnings per 
share and payout ratios, long time series from 1969 to 2010, and methodologies which address problems of 
endogeneity, non-stationarity and autocorrelation (including a Vector Error Correction Model approach), we 
find evidence on dividend signaling in Nordic markets. However, we also find heterogeneity in the 
relationship between dividends and earnings on markets similar in many respects, suggesting that even small 
variations in the institutional surroundings may be important for the results. 
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1. Introduction 
Recent studies of dividends in the U.S. have reported on both the “disapperance” of dividends (Fama and French 
2001), as well as of the fact that aggregate real dividends paid by industrial firms in fact have increased over the past 
two decades, although there has been a substantial concentration in the number of dividend paying firms (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, and Skinner 2004). However, Eije and Megginson (2008) demonstrate that the fraction of European firms 
paying dividends declines, while the real dividend payment and share repurchase steadily increase. Also other (not 
mutually exclusive with each other nor with the signaling hypothesis) theories for dividend payment in addition to the 
classical dividend signaling hypothesis, have gained ground, such as the catering theory of dividends developed by 
Baker and Wurgler (2004) and Li and Lie (2006) and tested by Denis and Osobov (2008) and Ferris et al. (2009). The 
findings of Ferris et al. (2009) indicate that the legal regime and its accompanying set of investor protections play a 
large role in whether dividend catering takes place.
1
 However, Fracassi (2008) stress that positive stock price response 
is due primarily to signaling and catering hypotheses, and partially to the free cash flow hypothesis of agency problem.   
At the same time, new methodologies used to test the information content of dividends (such as Vector Autoregressive 
Methods, often applied on aggregate dividends) have started to give supporting evidence to the classical dividend 
signaling hypothesis, see e.g. the results of Arnott and Asness (2003), Gwilym, Seaton, Suddason, and Thomas (2006), 
Lee and Rui (2007), as well as Lee (2010a) and (2010b).  
There is an ongoing debate in the literature concerning the use of aggregate versus individual firm-level data in studies 
of the information content of dividends. Disappointing results on aggregate data include Farsio et al. (2004), who did 
not found any relationships between dividends and earnings. Daniels et al. (1997) have argued that the use of 
aggregate data may be the reason for not being able to find a causal relationship between dividends and future earnings 
in previous empirical research. They specifically argue that the information content of dividends cannot be tested 
without obtaining biased results on aggregate data. However, they only found a Granger-causal relationship between 
dividends and future earnings in 50 percent of their randomly picked individual firm-level U.S. observations, which 
does not give any strong support for their argument of getting results very different from those when using aggregate 
data. Dittmar and Dittmar (2002) in turn argue that firm-level data is more likely to affect the analysis due to corporate 
                                                     
1 Dividend catering refers to the managerial behaviour of opportunistically modifying corporate payout policies when investor sentiment favours the 
payment of dividends. Investor sentiment for dividends is in turn often measured from the dividend premium (see Denis and Osobov, 2008; and 
Ferris et al. 2009), i.e. the difference between the market-to-book ratios between dividend payers and non-payers. 
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manipulations and earnings smoothing. Also Lee and Rui (2007) argue that firm-level data may cause biased 
estimates, and that aggregate data would therefore be preferred. Their results from a study on US data suggest that 
dividends convey information about future earnings, since dividends are found to Granger-cause future earnings, 
results similar also to Lee 2010a and Lee 2010b. Interestingly, the studies that have found a Granger-causal 
relationship between dividend and earnings on aggregate data are the ones using a VAR framework.  
Most of the studies on dividend signaling on aggregate data, and applying methods that better take the time-series 
properties of the data into account, have been performed in common law countries. We expect that dividend signaling, 
if it exists, may be more easier detected in civil law countries, since dividend catering is weak in these countries (Ferris 
et al. (2009), i.e. there may be one determinant less to drive dividend policies, in which case it may be easier to detect 
a potential signaling behavior. We contribute to the literature on dividend signaling by offering new evidence from 
three civil law countries, the Nordic countries of Denmark, Norway, and Sweden. Interestingly, although close to each 
other in terms of general corporate governance levels (see e.g. Aggarwal et al. 2009), the countries differ largely in 
terms of the average value given to dividends. Using aggregate data on real earnings per share and dividend payout 
ratios, together with a methodology which takes problems due to non-stationarity as well as autocorrelation into 
account, we find strong support for dividend signaling in Sweden, and weak support in Norway.  
Besides the question of whether dividends convey information of future earnings, we also contribute to the debate 
concerning the right way to test for the information content of dividends. Our results indicate that, contrary to some 
arguments in the literature, neither the long length of the sample period, nor the use of aggregate data instead of 
individual data, reduces the chances of finding significant relationships supporting dividend signaling. The 
methodology seems more likely to be the determining factor. Our varying results for the three Nordic countries also 
suggest that even smaller variations in legal regimes, corporate governance, ownership structures and / or 
macroeconomic environments may be of importance for the results.  
The paper is structured as follows. Section 2 presents a literature review and the hypotheses to be tested in this paper. 
In section 3, the data and method are described. In section 4, we report on the results. Finally, section 5 offers a 
summary and concluding remarks.  
2. Literature Review 
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Lintner (1956) was the first to recognize the information content of dividends, and the managerial reluctance to reduce 
dividends. According to Lintner (1956), the underlying reason behind the managerial reluctance to reduce dividends is 
that investors might interpret the action as a weakness in expected future earnings. Consequently, the decision to 
increase dividends would depend on the firm’s expected earnings stability, since managers want to make sure that the 
firms earnings will not decline after a raise in dividends. Dividends would, therefore, in a sense lag behind expected 
earnings, and be characterized as sticky. The idea that dividends could convey information about expected future 
earnings has later formally been presented in a number of signaling models, see e.g. Bhattcharaya (1979), Miller and 
Rock (1985) and John and Williams (1985), where it is the informational asymmetry between managers and outside 
investors that provides room for signaling with dividends.
2
 Alternative hypotheses for why dividends might be related 
to firm value include various agency cost based explanations: dividends reduce free cash flow (Easterbrook 1984), and 
may reduce agency problems between inside and outside shareholders (La Porta et al. 2000). Also clientele effects 
may produce a price reaction around dividend changes. 
 
Lintner’s observation of managerial reluctance to reduce dividends has empirically been studied on many markets, 
with varying results. Such studies may also be seen as preliminary studies of whether dividends might be able to carry 
information, since Kalay (1980) has shown that in order for dividends to convey information about future earnings, 
managers have to be reluctant to reduce dividends.
3
 Kalay’s (1980) own empirical evidence on US data on managerial 
reluctance to reduce dividends remains inconclusive, while DeAngelo et al. (1992) report supporting evidence. 
Supporting findings have also been reported for the UK, where Edward and Mayer (1986) used a survey approach 
regarding dividend policies directed at finance directors. They concluded that dividends are likely to be reduced if a 
decline in earnings is persistent, but unlikely if transient. Likewise, Marsh (1992) has shown that managers are 
reluctant to reduce dividends in the UK, and more recently also Brav et al. (2005) report, on the basis of the results 
from a survey to financial managers in the U.S. that 94 percent of the managers in dividend paying firms strongly or 
very strongly agree that dividend cuts are being avoided.  
 
                                                     
2 The idea that dividends could signal information about future earnings is not at odds with the dividend irrelevance proposition of Miller and 
Modigliani (1961), since there are no informational asymmetries in that model, and dividends can alternatively to being paid out, be left 
within the firm (however, keeping the investment policy of the firm fixed).  
3 However, DeAngelo and DeAngelo (1990) have argued that there are several reasons for the reluctance to reduce dividends, besides that 
suggested by Lintner (1956). A reluctance to cut dividends might thus be a necessary but not sufficient condition for dividends to carry an 
informational content. 
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Also event study tests typically confirm that the price reactions to dividend cuts / omissions are typically greater than 
to dividend increases, and that dividends do have some information content, since stock prices react to dividend 
changes (see e.g. Aharony and Swary 1980; Dielman and Oppenheimer 1984; Healy and Palepu 1988; Fehrs et al. 
1988; Asquith and Mullins 1983; Woolridge 1983; Brickley 1983; Kane et al. 1984; Kalay and Lowenstein 1985; Ofer 
and Siegel 1987; Dhillon and Johnson 1994; and Christie 1994; Abeyratna et al. 1996; Viswanath et al. 2002; and 
Cheng et al. 2007).
 4
 Michaely et al. (1995) have showed that dividend initiations lead to an increase in the stock price 
while omissions are followed by a stock price decline. Lee (1995), who investigated the relation between dividend 
shocks and stock price movements, has showed that stock prices do not only react to permanent changes but also to 
temporary changes in dividends. Finally, Amihud and Li (2006) have reported on the declining information content of 
dividend announcements, and found the effect to be a function of institutional holdings. However, most of the 
empirical evidence on stock price reactions to dividend announcements has been concentrated around developed 
markets (Mollah 2007) like the U.S. and the UK. Firm size has been shown to be a distinguishing factor regarding the 
relationship between dividend and security prices (Eddy and Seifert 1988; and Bajaj and Vijh 1995). Eddy and Seifert 
(1988) find that stock price reactions of small firms in comparison with big firms are greater when they experience an 
unexpected dividend increase. Bajaj and Vijh (1995) find that on average during dividend announcements, abnormal 
stock returns get larger the smaller the size of the firm. Zeghal (1983) has found empirical evidence showing that small 
firms are more transparent with their financial statements compared to large firms, and therefore the information 
content of dividends may depend on firm size.  
 
Since there are, besides signaling, other potential explanations for why stock prices may react to dividend changes, a 
more direct test of whether dividends carry information about future dividends is to study the time-series relationship 
between dividends and future earnings /earnings growth. While some researchers have found evidence of a significant 
positive relationship between dividends and earnings (see e.g. Healy and Palepu 1988; Kao and Wu 1994; and Brook 
et al. 1998), many others have found only a weak or no relationship at all (Venkatesh 1989; DeAngelo et al. 1996; 
Benartzi et al. 1997; Daniels et al. 1997; Baker et al. 2001; and Farsio et al. 2004).   
 
The results from most more recent research on the information content of dividend does not offer results different from 
the earlier ones, since there still is no consensus in empirical results. Nissim and Ziv (2001), Lee and Rui (2007) and 
Hanlon et al. (2006) find that dividends convey information on future earnings, while Fukuda (2000) and Grullon et al. 
                                                     
4 See also e.g. Nissim and Ziv (2001), who with the reference to a number of studies conclude that it is well documented that dividend 
changes are positively associated with stock returns in the days surrounding the announcement. 
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(2005) find weak or no evidence of a dividend signaling effect. However, recent research on managerial reluctance to 
reduce dividends supports Lintner’s (1956) observation of managerial reluctance to reduce dividends (Baker et al. 
2001 and Lie 2005).  
In addition to the empirical evidence on US and UK data, some empirical studies have been conducted on Western 
European markets. Ferris et al. (2009) tested the catering hypothesis in common law and civil law countries, and 
reported that, even though catering occurs in both common law and Scandinavian civil law groups, it is much stronger 
in common law than Scandinavian group.
5
 Their results support La Porta et al.’s (1998) shareholders right and Eije 
Megginson’s (2008) evidence on catering hypothesis in European civil law countries. Inspired by John and Williams 
(1985) with their dividend signaling model, based on different tax rates for capital gains and dividends, Amihud and 
Murgia (1997) have tested the dividend signaling model on German data. Their results do not contradict the US 
findings even though dividends are taxed at a preferable rate compared to the U.S. McDonald et al. (1975) have 
studied 75 French firms during a 7 year period in the 1960’s and found support for the Lintner model. Dasilas et al.  
(2008) found evidence supporting the information content of dividends in their study of Greek listed firms. A handful 
of studies on the relationship between dividends and earnings have also been conducted on data beyond the US, the 
UK and Western Europe. Lee (2010a and 2010b) has tested dividend signaling on the Singapore and Australian 
markets, and found evidence of a dividend signaling effect and support for the observation of managerial reluctance to 
reduce dividends by Lintner (1956). 
 
Most empirical studies of the relationship between dividends and earnings have been conducted using weak testing 
methods, such as the ordinary least squares (OLS) methodology (Lee 2010b). The OLS methodology assumes that the 
variables employed follow a stochastic process, which means that variables are assumed to be stationary. However, 
problems occur when conducting an OLS methodology but the variables are non-stationary, that is, when the variables 
are at least an I(1) process. In other words, they are integrated of order one and I(0) after being differenced in order to 
make them stationary. When there is integration of order one, and the variables are not cointegrated, OLS regressions 
are likely to produce spurious results (Brinca 2006). This implies that the t-statistics will be statistically significant, 
and the coefficient of determination will be high, indicating a meaningful relationship that is actually not there. 
                                                     
5 Ferris et al. (2009) also suggest that the weak catering is because of idiosyncratic behavior of the private benefits of control or a lack of 
interest in exploring transitory market misevaluations of their equity. 
  
6 
However, if the variables are differenced in order to make them stationary, the long-run relationship might be 
destroyed (Munnell, 1992).  
 
Another problem is autocorrelation. When the model applied is misspecified, autocorrelation in the error term might 
arise.  An example is when the model includes lagged dependent variables. Part of the Lintner model includes prior 
year’s dividends, so if the Lintner model is being tested with a simple OLS regression, the model will include a lagged 
dependent variable which means that the simple OLS regression may produce biased estimates (Frankfurter and Wood 
2003).  
 
A third problem that may occur when applying an OLS technique is the endogeneity bias (Mayston, 2005), which may 
e.g. occur in a multivariate regression when the independent variable is correlated with the error term of the regression 
model (Binstock et al. 2010). This specific issue can be dealt with by applying a Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) 
framework, because all variables are treated as endogenous (Sims 1980). 
 
So far, most of the empirical research on the informational content in dividends has also been conducted on US or UK 
data, while continental Europe has been overshadowed (Correia da Silva et al. 2004). In summary, the existing 
research on the topic is inconclusive, i.e. offers limited evidence on the information content of dividends. With respect 
to major methodological developments over time, there is also a lack of studies using the most recent methodologies 
and covering long enough time periods. The major objective of this paper is, therefore, to investigate if there is any 
informational content of dividends in the Nordic aggregate market. To be more specific, the following research 
question was addressed in the paper: Do dividends convey information about future earnings?  
 
3. Data and Method 
3.1 Data 
Our study is based on the aggregate monthly data for Denmark, Norway and Sweden for the period from 1969 to 2010. 
Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Indexes have been chosen due to their high representation of the market 
capitalization in the Nordic countries, and the availability of the longest historical data. We have collected monthly 
levels of the price index, price-earnings ratios (P/E-ratios), dividend yields and the consumer price index (CPI) from 
Statistics Sweden and Investment Strategist at Handelsbanken Capital Markets. We have derived earnings per share 
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(EPS) and dividend payout ratio (DPR) from these data and the derivation procedure
6
 for EPS and DPR is the same as 
Lee (2010b) and is also inspired by Arnott and Asness (2003) and Gwilym et al. (2006). A time series plot of EPS and 
DPR is presented in figures 1 and 2, respectively, to visualize the pattern of the data for these countries below.  
 
 INSERT FIGURES 1 AND 2 HERE 
 
Non-stationarity of the EPS and DPR data are clearly visible in figures 1 and 2. Moreover, the Scandinavian banking 
crisis in early 1990s causes a serious economic downturn in these countries. The recession is reflected in the aggregate 
EPS and DPR data presented in figures 1 and 2, and  in addition, a structural break is identified in all these three 
Nordic countries in the early 1990’s. Besides the banking crisis, the structural break may also be related to the 
internationalization of the Nordic countries in the early 1990’s (due to the abolishment of capital restrictions, in 
anticipation of the European Union), leading to a large inflow of international investors (with potentially different 
dividend preferences). The descriptive statistics are presented in Table 1. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
 
The EPS series (as in Lee 2010b), is negative by construction, coming from the indexing and taking the natural 
logarithm of the resulting ratio, but it shows a slight upward trend. It is also notable that the Nordic countries pay 
(DPR) a very high and rather stable dividend.  
3.2 Method 
3.2.1 Unit Root Tests: The key relationship that we want to test is that between the time-series variables of real 
earnings per share (EPS) and the dividend payout ratio (DPR), in logarithmic form. We test EPS and DPR for non-
stationarity by applying the Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) procedure
7
, which tests for unit root when the time 
                                                     
6 The data used to derive real earnings per share (EPS) and the dividend payout ratio (DPR) are monthly values of the MSCI price indexes for the 
three Nordic countries, price-earnings ratios (P/E-ratios), dividend yields and the country specific consumer price indexes (CPIs). The monthly value 
for the price index is divided by the corresponding P/E-ratio to obtain earnings per share, which is then divided by the CPI to obtain real earnings 
per share (EPS). Dividend payout ratio (DPR) is obtained by multiplying dividend yield with the P/E-ratio. 
7 Serial correlation in the residuals encounters a problem in the Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller 1979) test, which drives into biased estimations. 
However, an appropriate lag selection removes the problem in the DF test (Brinca, 2006). Due to this problem, we have adopted the Augmented 
Dickey-Fuller (Dickey and Fuller 1981) test. 
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series variables are an I(1) process, and the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin (KPSS) test, which is a Lagrange 
Multiplier (LM) test where the time series variables are an I(0) process.
8
  
 
 
3.2.2 Johansen Procedure: If EPS and DPR are integrated of order one, that is an I(1) process and I(0) after being 
differenced once in order to make them stationary, the variables might be cointegrated. Therefore we next apply the 
Johansen (1991) procedure, which can be specified to measure long run effects and transitory effects. Depending on 
the outcome of the cointegration tests using Johansen procedure, a Vector Auto Regressive (VAR) or a Vector Error 
Correction Model (VECM) will be used in order to perform the ultimate test in our study. Since it is important that one 
formulates the deterministic term (when a constant, trend or dummy component is included in the cointegration) 
correctly in the Johansen test, otherwise, it might produce biased parameter estimates (Hendry and Juselius, 2001). We 
therefore also apply the Saikkonen and Lutkepohl cointegration test, which can eliminate this problem.
9
 Since 
autocorrelation may lead to misspecification, and thus to biased and inconsistent estimates (Keele and Kelly 2006), we 
apply Lutkepohl’s (2004) Portmanteau test which tests for autocorrelation up to a specific and specified lag in the 
residuals of a time series model instead of testing each distinctive lag. 
3.2.3 Vector Auto-Regressive (VAR) Model/Vector Error Correction Model (VECM): The traditional VAR model can 
be used to estimate variables that depend on several combinations of lagged values and error terms of several 
variables, including lags of the dependent variable itself. If there is a cointegration between the variables, the VAR 
model has to be transformed into a VECM, which is a restricted VAR created to deal with non-stationary variables
10
. 
The VECM in this paper is in line with Johansen (1991) framework as: 
 
… (1) 
                                                     
8 It has been argued that specifying the null hypothesis as a unit root or non-stationary may be a weakness of tests such as the ADF test (Pfaff 
2008). For that reason, the Kwiatkowski-Phillips-Schmidt-Shin test (Kwiatkowski, Phillips, Schmidt, Shin, 1992) is also adopted in the 
study. 
9 The Saikkonen and Lutkepohl cointegration test is based on a reduced rank regression and differs from the Johansen procedure since it 
starts with an estimation of the deterministic term (Saikkonen and Lutkepohl 2000a, b, c and Lutkepohl 2004). The Johansen Trace procedure 
is then applied after the deterministic term is subtracted from the model. Saikkonen and Lutkepohl have suggested a Generalized Least 
Squares (GLS) procedure to estimate the specific parameters of deterministic term.  
10 Engle and Granger (1987) noticed that when modeling with VARs where the variables are cointegrated, their estimates in first differences or 
levels will be biased and therefore suggests the VECM (Penm et al. 1997).   
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 …(2) 
 
where  represents the product of the α and β matrix with the dimensions (𝐾 ∗ 𝑟), and  K is the set of variables and r 
is the number of cointegrating relationships such that  .  is often referred to as the long run parameter and 
 the short run parameter, which captures the long in the former and short run dynamics in the latter of the variables. 
But, when there is one cointegrating relationship, can be written as: 
 
 …(3) 
Furthermore, Granger-Causality (Granger 1969) is a widely used phenomenon in this context. When lagged values of a 
variable 𝒚𝒕 contribute to an improvement of the forecast of a variable 𝒙𝒕 after being controlled for lagged values of 𝒙𝒕, 
it is said to be casual (Wooldridge 2005 and Lutkepohl 2004), i.e., 𝒚𝒕 granger causes 𝒙𝒕 if 𝒚𝒕 is a useful predictor of 
𝒙𝒕. The Granger causality test has the ability of predicting each one of our variables statistical impact on their future 
value (Brooks 2008), that is, telling us if one variable Granger -causes the other. Brooks (2008) also argues that the 
information of a positive or negative relation or the time horizon of when the impact will take place cannot be 
predicted by a Granger-causality test but Impulse responses,
11
 on the other hand, have the ability of doing so.  
4. Results and Analysis 
4.1. Results from stationarity tests 
 
First, we test the EPS and DPR series for non-stationarity in their levels and first differences by applying the ADF test. 
The results are presented in Table 2. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                     
11 Impulse responses traces the reactions of the dependent variable to a unit shock of all the other variables in a dynamic system, that is, by hitting the 
error term with a shock, one traces the effects on the dependent variable over time (Brooks 2008).   
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The results in Table 2 (Panel A) indicate that EPS and DPR are non-stationary and contain a unit root in their levels. 
The null hypothesis of a unit root fails to be rejected for both EPS and DPR with drift and trend, trend only, and 
neither drift nor trend. Panel B in turn indicates that EPS and DPR are stationary and not containing a unit root in their 
first differences. The null hypothesis is rejected both when tested for drift and trend, trend only and with neither drift 
and nor trend. EPS and DPR are also tested for stationarity at their levels and first difference using KPSS. The lag 
order is determined by the truncation parameter 𝑙𝑞 where q is frequently set to 4 and 12 (see Schwert 1989), which are 
both used in the test. The results are presented in Table 3. 
 INSERT TABLE 3 ABOUT HERE 
 
As before, the results in Table 3 (Panel A) indicate that EPS and DPR are non-stationary in their levels, since the null 
hypothesis of a stationary process is rejected both at the 5 and 10 percent significance levels when tested with a 
constant and trend. Moreover, the test results in Panel B also indicate that EPS and DPR are stationary in first 
difference terms. The null hypothesis of a stationary process cannot be rejected when tested with a constant and trend 
on a 5 and 10 percents significance level. Therefore, the KPSS test indicates an integration order of one (i.e. an I(1) 
process), just like the prior ADF test. The identical results from both the ADF test and KPSS test increase the 
reliability concerning the order of integration, and the credibility that EPS and DPR are non-stationary in level terms. 
Consequently, the results also indicate that there might be a cointegrating relationship between the two variables.  
 
4.2 Results from cointegration tests  
The variables are tested for cointegration by applying the Johansen
12
 Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace tests including 
constant. If too many lags are used, the degrees of freedom may consume too much power from the test, while not 
using enough lags may limit the test from capturing the proper dynamics (Brinca 2006). Therefore, the chosen lag 
order is 4 for both tests. In order to capture the short run effects of the relationship between EPS and DPR, the 
Johansen Maximum Eigenvalue and Trace tests are specified with a transitory procedure and the test results are 
reported in Table 4.  
 INSERT TABLE 4 ABOUT HERE 
 
                                                     
12 Before the tests were applied, we wanted to determine the optimal lag order for the cointegration tests. The AIC, HQ, SC and FPE information 
criteria suggest an optimal lag order of 5, 4, 3 and 5, respectively. 
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The result of the Trace test for cointegration in Table 4 indicates a cointegrating relation between EPS and DPR. The 
null hypothesis of a cointegrating relation being r=0 is rejected between the variables at 5 and 10 percent significance 
levels. But the null hypothesis of the cointegrating relation being r=1 between the two variables failed to be rejected at 
a 5 and 10 percent significance level, which indicates that EPS and DPR are cointegrated.  The results of the 
Maximum Eigenvalue test in turn indicate a cointegrating relation between EPS and DPR.  The null hypothesis of a 
cointegrating relation being r=0 can also be rejected at a 5 and 10 percent significance level, while the null hypothesis 
of a cointegrating relation being r=1 failed to be rejected at a 5 and 10 percent significance level, which also support 
that the EPS and DPR are cointegrated.  
 
Nevertheless, including a deterministic term (in our case a constant) might produce biased estimates if it is formulated 
incorrectly. Therefore, in addition to the Johansen procedure, a cointegration test (Saikkonen and Lutkepohl) that 
accounts for the deterministic term is applied with the same lag order as in the Johansen procedure since it goes by the 
Johansen Trace test after the deterministic term is estimated and subtracted. The outcome of the test are reported in 
Table 5. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 5 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results of the Saikkonen and Lutkepohl test also support a cointegrating relation between EPS and DPR, and the 
null hypothesis of a cointegrating relation between the variables being r=0 is rejected at a 5 and 10 percent significance 
level. The null hypothesis of the cointegrating relation being r=1, on the other hand, failed to be rejected at 5 and 10 
percent significance level.  
 
The cointegration results based on the three tests performed clearly indicate that EPS and DPR are cointegrated, which 
means that the model will be specified with a VECM approach in order to avoid biased estimates. 
4.3  Results from the VECM approach 
 
Since the models applied in the paper deal with lag values, autocorrelation might cause biased and inconsistent 
estimates. In order to avoid this inefficiency, the residuals in the VECM are tested for autocorrelation by applying the 
Portmanteau test. The test results are reported in Table 6. 
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 INSET TABLE 6 ABOUT HERE 
 
The Portmanteau test for autocorrelation reports no autocorrelation in the residuals of the VECM up to 9 lags for 
Sweden, 13 lags for Denmark and 15 lags for Norway. The null hypothesis of no autocorrelation in the residuals up to 
specified lag order failed to be rejected, indicating that the VECM estimates are not likely to be biased and 
inconsistent. 
 
When two variables are integrated of order one, that is, where both variables are an  I(1) process, and cointegrated, 
then at least one of the variables must Granger-cause the other variable. The idea of dividend signaling is that 
dividends convey information about future earnings. If this is true, DPR should Granger-cause EPS. The test results 
are presented in Table 7. 
 
 INSERT TABLE 7 ABOUT HERE 
 
The results in Table 7 offer mixed support for dividend signaling in the Nordic countries. There is some support for 
both DPR Granger-causing EPS for some countries, as well as EPS Granger-causing DPR. For Sweden, both null 
hypotheses of no Granger-causality are rejected at a significance level of 1 percent. This means, there is support for the 
informational content of dividends in Sweden. The results for the Swedish market are thus similar to the results of Lee 
and Rui 2007, Lee 2010a and Lee 2010b for US, Singapore, and Australia, respectively. But the results for the Danish 
and Norwegian markets are different. The result in Table 7 indicate that dividends do not convey any information 
about future earnings in Denmark, and we also obtain only weak support for signaling in Norway (the hypothesis of 
dividends not Granger-causing earnings being rejected only at the 10% level).  
 
Concerning the specific case of Denmark, our results resemble those in Farsio et al. (2004), who found no significant 
Granger-causal relationships between dividends and earnings. Based on their simple OLS regression and Granger 
causality test, Farsio et al. suggested that the results from earlier studies reporting positive or negative relationships 
between dividends and earnings were due to limited data samples, and that long sample periods would indicate no 
relationship between dividends and earnings in the long run. However, the sample period does not seem to have any 
major influence on the Granger-causality test for investigating the relationship between dividends and earnings since 
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both Lee (2010a&b), as well as our study, both using data for time periods longer than 30 years, have found some 
significant relationships (in our case, a strong relationship for Sweden) between dividends and earnings.  
 
There are several differences between these prior studies of the relationship between dividends and earnings including 
our study. First of all, Farsio et al. (2004) have used a sample period of 14 years (1988-2002) to estimate their simple 
OLS regression and 12 years (1988-2000) in their Granger causality test and Daniels et al. (1997) have used 15 years 
(1975-1990), Lee and Rui (2007) 8 years (1992-2000), Lee (2010a) 17.5 years (Jan 1990- June 2007) and Lee (2010b) 
over 39 years of data (1969-2009) while our study is based on over 41 years of data. Secondly, Daniels et al. (1997) 
use firm-level data while all the other studies use aggregate data, including our study.  Thirdly, all of the above 
mentioned empirical studies have been conducted on the US data excepting Lee (2010a and 2010b), who have 
investigated the Singapore and Australian markets. We provide further evidence concerning three Nordic markets.  
Finally, our methodologies differ, this study as well as those of Lee (2010a and 2010b), and Lee and Rui (2007), being 
implemented in VAR frameworks suited for handling endogeneity, which is not the case in Farsio et al. (2004) and 
Daniels et al. (1997).  
 
Our study provides some additional information to the debate on how to study the relationship between dividends and 
earnings using aggregate data. The results indicate that, contrary to some arguments in the literature, neither the long 
length of the sample period, nor the use of aggregate data instead of individual data, reduces the chances of finding 
significant relationships supporting dividend signaling when using a Granger-causality test. The methodology seems 
more likely to be the determining factor. Our varying results for the three Nordic countries (in many ways similar to 
each other) also suggest that even smaller variations in legal regimes, corporate governance, ownership structures and 
macroeconomic environments are important for the results. Australia and the US are both Anglo-Saxon economies, 
and common law countries, while Nordic countries are civil law countries and differ both from the Anglo-Saxon and 
the Continental European model, even though Sweden is moving towards a more Anglo-Saxon inspired economy 
(Crouch and Streeck, 1997). The Anglo-Saxon law is derived from the common law; therefore, the civil law countries 
are different from Anglo-Saxon and common law countries. La Porta et al. (1998 and 2000) studies provide ample 
evidence on differences in shareholder protection and payout policies in different legal regimes. La Porta et al. (1998) 
stress that the common law countries offer better shareholder protection than civil law countries. In addition, in their 
follow-up research in 2000, they find that the common law countries pay higher dividends than the civil law countries. 
Lin (2013) finds that the common law countries pay higher dividends, and also that dividends are less sensitive to 
earnings there. The higher dividend sensitivity to earnings in civil law countries is in line with dividend signaling. If 
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shareholder rights are lower in civil law countries, perhaps there is a greater need for profitable firms to convey 
information through dividends. The results of the Granger-causality test in our paper support the idea that dividends 
convey information about future earnings in Sweden, less so in Norway, while no relationship was found for Denmark. 
5. Summary and Conclusions 
This study addresses the issue of the informational content of dividends in the aggregate markets for three Nordic 
countries, and makes several contributions to the literature.  
We contribute to the literature concerning the signaling motive for dividends, and the information content of 
dividends, using a novel methodology applied to a data set where other, possibly blurring motives for dividend 
payments, may be weaker. The dividend signaling theory has recently been challenged in many studies. Most of the 
studies of the information content of dividends using more recent methods have been performed in common law 
countries such as the U.S., Singapore, and Australia. In such countries, multiple (not mutually exclusive) driving 
forces for dividends may be present, such as the catering motive, making it harder to study whether one specific 
motive (our target, the signaling motive) also is present. Since Ferris et al (2009) find weaker evidence of catering for 
civil law firms, we select such countries to our study.  If dividend catering does produce behaviour that may cloud the 
information content of dividends, then civil law countries offer better opportunities for finding evidence in favour of 
dividend signaling.
13
 We report results for three civil law countries, Denmark, Norway, and Sweden, using a long time 
series from 1969 to 2010. We apply the Granger-causality test. These tests indicate that dividend payout conveys 
information about future earnings in Sweden, while some support of Granger-causality is also obtained for Norway.  
 
Second, our study provides some additional information to the debate on how to study the relationship between 
dividends and earnings. The results indicate that, contrary to some arguments in the literature, neither the long length 
of the sample period, nor the use of aggregate data instead of individual data, reduces the chances of finding 
significant relationships supporting dividend signaling. The methodology seems more likely to be the determining 
factor. Earlier empirical studies of the relationship between dividends and future earnings have typically been 
conducted with simple OLS techniques. Most time-series variables are non-stationary, so if the time-series variables of 
earnings and dividends are non-stationary, the OLS framework might yield spurious results. If the explanatory 
                                                     
13 See also Lin (2013) who find that in civil law countries, dividends are more sensitive to earnings as compared to common law countries. 
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variables in the regression suffer from endogeneity, the OLS framework creates biased results. We are the first to use a 
VECM framework in the European Civil Law countries that prevents the problem of endogeneity and takes non-
stationarity into account in order to avoid spurious, biased or inconsistent results when examining the relationship 
between dividends and earnings.  
 
Finally, Baker (2009) stresses the view that despite the legal frameworks, tax regimes, corporate governance, 
ownership structures and macroeconomic environments, which differ between countries, the driving forces for 
dividend policy are similar. However, our varying results for the three Nordic countries (in many ways similar to each 
other) suggest that even small variations in legal regimes, corporate governance, ownership structures and 
macroeconomic environments may be important for the results. 
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics of EPS and DPR for three Nordic countries 
 
This table presents descriptive statistics (means, minimum and maximum values, and standard deviations) for our 
series of logarithmic real earnings per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratios (DPR) for Denmark, Norway, and 
Sweden for the time period of 1969 to 2010. 
 
Country  Variable Mean Min Max Std.dev. 
Denmark EPS -6.37 -7.69 1.23 -2.88 
  DPR 7.71 1.21 8.92 2.56 
Norway EPS -3.31 -5.87 2.28 2.22 
  DPR 4.67 0.73 6.59 1.74 
Sweden EPS -5.65 -7.49 0.61 1.13 
  DPR 7.55 0.59 8.52 0.55 
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Table 2 . Results from tests of stationarity 
 
This table presents Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test statistics of unit root for the real earnings per share 
(EPS) and dividend payout ratio (DPR) variables for the three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden). 
Panel A reports results of tests in level terms, whereas Panel B results from tests in first difference terms. The 
optimal lag found by the information criterions for EPS and DPR was 5 and 8 for Sweden, 8 for Denmark, and 
10 for Norway. The critical values in tests with a drift and trend are -3,98 for 1% level of significance and -3,42 
for 5% level of significance, with trend only -3,44 for 1% level of significance and -2,87 for 5% level of 
significance, and with neither drift nor trend  -2,58 for 1% level of significance and -1,95 for 5% level of 
significance. *** denotes significance at the 1% level, and ** at the 5% level. 
 
 
Panel A: Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test in level terms  
Country 
 
  
Variable
 
 
 
Test statistic with 
drift and trend
 
 
Test statistic with 
trend only
 
 
Test statistic 
with neither drift 
nor trend 
 
Denmark EPS -3.5904** -1.2174 -0.9351 
  DPR -3.2746 -1.9682 -0.9756 
Norway EPS -4.1413*** -2.5674 -0.7309 
  DPR -3.8005** -3.6862*** -0.2071 
Sweden EPS -3.2931 -0.9356 -1.1844 
  DPR -2.8864 -2.6039 -0.3843 
 
Panel B. Augmented Dickey–Fuller (ADF) test in first difference terms 
Country 
 
  
Variable
 
 
 
Test statistic with 
drift and trend
 
 
Test statistic with 
trend only
 
 
Test statistic 
with neither drift 
nor trend 
 
Denmark EPS -11.2152*** -11.2156*** -11.1889*** 
  DPR   -9.4130*** -10.8896*** -10.8616*** 
Norway EPS -10.0672***   -8.9964***   -9.0020*** 
  DPR -10.6891*** -10.6979*** -10.7093*** 
Sweden EPS -12.9781*** -12.9869*** -12.9392*** 
  DPR -10.2317*** -10.2389*** -10.2464*** 
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Table 3 . Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test 
 
The table reports results from tests of stationary applying the Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test for the 
real earnings per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratio (DPR) variables for the three Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden). Panel A reports results of tests in level terms, whereas Panel B results from tests in first 
difference terms. The lag order is determined by the truncation parameter 𝑙𝑞 where q is frequently set to 4 and 12 
(Schwert. 1989). The optimal lag found by the information criterions for EPS and DPR was 5 and 17 for Sweden, 5 
and 17 for Denmark, and 5 and 16 for Norway. The critical values in tests with a constant are 0.463 for 5% level of 
significance and 0.347 for 10% level of significance, and with trend only, 0.146 for 5% level of significance and 0.119 
for 10% level of significance. *** denotes significance at the 1% level. 
 
Panel A. Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test in level terms  
  
Country 
 
Variable
 
 
lq 
 
Test statistic  
with constant
 
Test statistic  
with Trend Only 
Denmark EPS 12 2.4523*** 0.2860*** 
  4 6.8237*** 0.6315*** 
 DPR 12 2.1044*** 0.3429*** 
    4 5.6222*** 0.7849*** 
Norway EPS 12 1.4621*** 0.1487*** 
  4 4.2481*** 0.2606*** 
 DPR 12 0.5513*** 0.2705*** 
    4 1.0091*** 0.4789*** 
Sweden EPS 12 2.6124*** 0.2051*** 
  4 7.5857*** 0.5191*** 
 DPR 12 1.1713*** 0.3649*** 
    4 3.0221*** 0.8945*** 
Panel B: Kwiatkowski–Phillips–Schmidt–Shin (KPSS) test in first difference terms 
 
Country  
 
Variable 
 
Lq 
 
Lags 
 
Test statistic  
with a constant 
Test statistic  
with a trend 
Denmark EPS 12 17 0.0418 0.0225 
  4 5 0.0173 0.0093 
 DPR 12 17 0.0271 0.0278 
    4 5 0.0109 0.0112 
Norway EPS 12 16 0.0233 0.0190 
  4 5 0.0117 0.0095 
 DPR 12 16 0.0255 0.0229 
    4 5 0.0114 0.0102 
Sweden EPS 12 17 0.0565 0.0422 
  4 5 0.0272 0.0203 
 DPR 12 17 0.0292 0.0292 
    4 5 0.0136 0.0136 
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Table 4. Results from the Johansen cointegration Trace and  the Maximum Eigenvalue tests 
The table reports results from Johansen cointegration Trace tests, and Maximum Eigenvalue tests, for the real 
earnings per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratio (DPR) variables for three Nordic countries (Denmark, 
Norway and Sweden). The critical values for the Trace test are 9.24 for 5% level of significance and 7.52 for 
10% level of significance when there is at least 1 cointegrating relation, and 19.96 for 5% level of significance 
and 17.85 for 10% level of significance when there is no cointegrating relation. The critical values for the 
Maximum Eigenvalue test are  9.24 for 5% level of significance and 7.52 for 10% level of significance when 
there is at least 1 cointegrating relation, and 15.67 for 5% level of significance and 13.75 for 10% level of 
significance when there is no cointegrating relation. ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * at the 10% 
level. 
 
Country 
 
Cointegrating 
relations 
Trace  
test statistic  
Maximum Eigenvalue  
test statistic 
Denmark r  <=  1 1.83  1.83 
  r = 0 27.38**  25.55** 
Norway r  <=  1 1.71  1.71 
  r = 0 20.59**  18.88** 
Sweden r  <=  1 3.43  3.43 
  r = 0 22.61** 19.18** 
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Table 5:  Results from the Saikkonen and Lutkepohl cointegration  tests 
The table reports results from Saikkonen and Lutkepohl cointegration tests, for the real earnings per share (EPS) and 
dividend payout ratio (DPR) variables for three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden). The critical values 
for the test are 4.13 for 5% level of significance and 2.98 for 10% level of significance when there is at least 1 
cointegrating relation, and 12.26 for 5% level of significance and 10.47 for 10% level of significance when there is no 
cointegrating relation. ** denotes significance at the 5% level, and * at the 10% level. 
 
Country  
 
Cointegrating- 
relations 
Test statistic  
 
Denmark r  <=  1 0.96  
  r = 0 12.41**  
Norway r  <=  1  0.04  
  r = 0 17.36**  
Sweden r  <=  1 1.38 
  r = 0 20.40** 
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Table 6.  Results from asymptotic Portmanteau tests for autocorrelation 
The table reports results from asymptotic Portmanteau tests for autocorrelation, for the real earnings per share (EPS) 
and dividend payout ratio (DPR) variables for three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden).  
 
Country  Portmanteau test With intercept 
Denmark Test statistic 50.5527 
 p-value 0.1715 
 Degrees of freedom 42 
  Lag order 13 
Norway Test statistic 23.9841 
 p-value 0.1555 
 Degrees of freedom 18 
  Lag order 15 
Sweden Test statistic 21.5673 
 p-value 0.486 
 Degrees of freedom 22 
  Lag order 9 
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Table 7.  Results from Granger causality tests 
The table reports results from Granger causality tests for the real earnings per share (EPS) and dividend payout ratio 
(DPR) variables for three Nordic countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden). The bi-directional Granger causality tests 
are conducted between EPS and DPR for the Nordic countries. Bi-directional Granger causality tests the null 
hypotheses between EPS and DPR, e.g. EPS does not Granger cause DPR and vice versa. The test statistics and p-
values are presented in columns 3 and 4 respectively.  
 
Country  Granger-Causality test with intercept Test statistic p-value 
Denmark H0:  DPR Does not Granger-cause EPS 0.0119 0.9982 
  H0:   EPS Does not Granger-cause DPR 1.2387 0.2944 
Norway H0:  DPR Does not Granger-cause EPS 1.7095 0.0666 
  H0:   EPS Does not Granger-cause DPR 0.4246 0.9456 
Sweden H0:  DPR Does not Granger-cause EPS 8.6438 0.0000 
  H0:   EPS Does not Granger-cause DPR 16.5517 0.0000 
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Figure 1. Time series plot of real earnings per share (EPS)  
The figure shows the time-series behavior of logarithmic real earnings per share (EPS) in three Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Norway and Sweden) from 1969 to 2010. 
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Figure 2. Time series plot of dividend payout ratio (DPR) series 
The figure describes the time-series behavior of the logarithmic dividend payout ratio (DPR) series in three Nordic 
countries (Denmark, Norway and Sweden) from 1969 to 2010. 
 
 
 
 
